Empire’s h(a)unting grounds: theorising violence and resistance in Egypt and Afghanistan by Manchanda, Nivi & Salem, Sara
Empire’s h(a)unting grounds: theorising violence and resistance in 
Egypt and Afghanistan
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102631/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Manchanda, Nivi and Salem, Sara (2019) Empire’s h(a)unting grounds: theorising
violence and resistance in Egypt and Afghanistan. Current Sociology. ISSN 1461-
7064 (In Press) 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
Empire’s H(a)unting Grounds:  
Theorising violence and resistance in Egypt and Afghanistan 
 
Nivi Manchanda, Queen Mary University of London 
Sara Salem, London School of Economics 
 
Abstract  
 
This article thinks theory otherwise by searching for what is missing, silent and yet 
highly productive and constitutive of present realities’. Looking at Afghanistan and 
Egypt, we show how imperial legacies and capitalist futurities are rendered 
invisible by dominant social theories, and why it matters that we think beyond an 
empiricist sociology in the Middle East. In Afghanistan, we explore the ways in 
which portrayals of the country as retrogressive elide the colonial violence that that 
have ensured the very backwardness that is now considered Afghanistan’s 
enduring characteristic. Specifically using the example of the institutionalisation 
of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), we ask what alternative narratives might 
emerge if we take empire’s ghosts seriously on their own terms? In Egypt, we look 
at the ways in which Gamal Abdel Nasser’s anticolonial project continues to haunt 
present-day Egyptian political, social and economic life. In particular, we ask how 
anticolonial nationalism and its promises produced lingering after-effects, and how 
we can understand these through the figure of the ‘spectre.’ The article asks what 
it would mean to produce social theory through (re)visiting sites of resistance, 
violence and contestation, proposing haunting as a means through which to 
understand and analyse political, social and economic change in the Middle East. 
 
Introduction  
 
Thinking theory otherwise through a re-historicisation and de-mystification of the present, is 
increasingly necessary in the wider ‘Middle East,’1 where imperial legacies, capitalist futurities 
and geopolitical interventions consistently render the region a place of conflict and 
contestation, but also a space for resistance and hope for a different world. The ‘Middle East,’ 
broadly conceived, is both a central node within global racial and imperial structural 
formations, as well as a region in which anticolonial movements were extremely powerful and 
widespread throughout the twentieth century; indeed, these two points are not unconnected. In 
this article, we explore questions of resistance through haunting, ghosts, and spectres. This is 
not a critique of empirical work but the sort of empiricism that privileges ‘backwardness’ in 
Afghanistan and authoritarianism in Egypt, but ignores the constitutive/productive spectres of 
                                                 
1 We are aware of the Orientalism inherent in labelling the region between Pakistan and Morocco the ‘Middle East’, 
but for the purposes of clarity and consistency we have chosen to deploy the term throughout this article. In some 
ways the appellation itself haunts: for instance, Afghanistan remains at the margins of this geographical and cultural 
entity, a marginalisation that persists in the ways in which imperial powers (past and present) have interacted with the 
country. And yet both Egypt and Afghanistan are drawn into a space labelled the ‘Middle East’ without much attention 
to what this flattens. We are thus conscious that both countries belong to multiple geographical imaginaries at the 
same time, which is why we use the term Middle East with caution.  
colonial administration and anticolonial nationalism respectively. Through haunting, we aim 
to instead foreground these spectres in order to show how rich empirical work that is sensitive 
to questions of power and resistance can centre very different narratives in the Middle East. 
Focusing on the two very distinct contexts of Afghanistan and Egypt2, and drawing on the 
works of scholars, including Avery Gordon and Omnia el Shakry who have engaged ‘haunting’ 
and absence conceptually by linking these to empire, we ask what it would mean to think about 
social theory through (re)visiting sites of resistance, violence and contestation.  
 
Specifically, we are interested in how ‘presentist’ approaches to explaining political 
developments plague both the study of Afghanistan and Egypt, and how haunting provides an 
alternative that blurs time and space. As Jasbir Puar has argued “haunting defuses the binary 
between the past and the present” and is also a methodological approach that “keeps an eye out 
for shadows, ephemera, energies, ethereal forces, textures, spirit, sensations” (Puar, 2017: xx). 
Haunting enables us to go beyond the tendencies present in much scholarship within political 
sociology on the Middle East – that continues to underscore ‘institutions’, ‘authoritarianism’, 
and linear narratives of ‘progress’ – and offers instead a diagnostic of power and empire that 
takes what Derek Gregory (2004) calls the “colonial present” seriously.3 Moreover, haunting—
given its less finite nature—also allows us to suggest an alternative place for empiricism within 
research on the region, and instead explore alternative ways of reading and knowing. We do 
this by privileging a “vulnerable reading” rather than presumed hard facts, resisting 
disciplinary enclosure, and refusing to restrict in advance our knowledge to vaunted sources 
and acclaimed schools of thought. Haunting demands that we listen to that which has been 
neglected and proclaimed useless or unimportant. 
 
We begin this article in colonial Afghanistan, where we explore the ways in which portrayals 
of the country as regressive elide the colonial violence that that has ensured the very 
backwardness that is now considered Afghanistan’s enduring characteristic. Analysing the 
Federal Crimes Regulation (FCR) and probing the construal of Afghanistan as ‘the graveyard 
of empires’ we ask what alternative narratives might emerge if we take empire’s ghosts 
seriously on their own terms? That is, not as some incidental after-effect of colonial violence, 
but as constitutive of that very violence. To highlight this, we first unpack the FCR by 
understanding it as a colonial construct that continues to (re)make the subjects it claims to 
govern. We engage the ghosts that the FCR spawned and show how these colonial era laws 
continue to define present day Afghanistan.  Haunting, then, is both a way of making sense of 
colonial afterlives and the ways in which colonialism continues to structure the world, as well 
as a theoretical means of accounting for absences and silences in dominant paradigms of 
sociological thought. 
 
                                                 
2 These two contexts are quite central to the politics of colonialism and anti-colonialism in the broader ‘Middle East’, 
and the aspects of these cases that we look at unpack the particularities of European colonialism in Afghanistan, long 
understood as the ‘graveyard of empire,’ and of anticolonialism in Egypt, a central locus of Third Worldism and global 
anticolonial resistance.  
3 There are important exceptions to this and over the past two decades there has been a surge of critical scholarship 
drawing attention towards the complexity of political sociological work on the region. See, inter alia, Chalcraft 2016, 
2012; Povey 2016; Khalili 2007; Rasheed 2010, 2013. 
We then move to postcolonial Egypt, where we look at the ways in which Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s anticolonial project continues to haunt present-day Egyptian political, social and 
economic life. Anti-colonial moments are equally implicated in haunting: they produce their 
own spectres, shaping the present in ways that continue to over-emphasise the colonial 
moment, serving in effect to recentre rather than decentre the colonisers. In this section, we ask 
how anticolonial nationalism and its promises produced lingering after-effects, and how we 
can understand these through the figure of the ‘spectre.’ By focusing on two ‘Suez Canal 
moments’ in modern Egypt, we unpack the question of haunting and its effects on nationalism 
in Egypt today. What can the spectre of anticolonial nationalism, to which the nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal was so central, reveal about our current contemporary ultra-nationalist 
juncture, which also had its ‘Suez Canal moment’? We show how Nasser’s nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal in important ways prefigures Sisi’s similar attempt post-2011, and that these 
events must be understood as mutually implicated in resistance to colonial violence. We show, 
in contradistinction to Stoler who focuses primarily on the afterlife of empire, that colonial and 
postcolonial haunting are two sides of the same coin. The postcolonial afterlives emerge out of 
colonial artefacts and instantiations, and in turn leave indelible imprints on the ways in which 
colonialism is apprehended. In the final section, we further illuminate the concept of ‘haunting’ 
by drawing on an established theoretical apparatus as explicated by Gordon, in order to better 
understand and analyse political, social and economic change in the Middle East. We flesh out 
more fully what is at stake in grappling with ‘haunting’ as a concept, and how it may shed light 
on other moments and spaces. 
 
On Haunting  
 
This article is interested, then, in both tracing moments of haunting in modern Egypt and 
Afghanistan and unpacking what they mean socially and politically on the one hand, and 
exploring what haunting can provide us with theoretically on the other. We engage with two 
broad sets of literature: one that has explored the afterlives of European empire in the Middle 
East, and another that has thought about haunting as a theoretical approach more broadly. In 
this section we sketch out these sets of literature in order to better highlight our engagement 
with them. We show that while haunting as an approach to social and political life is by no 
means new, it has yet to be mobilised extensively in work on the Middle East, a region where 
the afterlives of European empire are acute.4 Looking for ghosts and spectres raises questions 
around what we understand to be theory, evidence, or ‘data.’ It moves us beyond the visible 
and measurable; listening to ghosts means listening to and for what is not always apparent; we 
probe alternate sites and archives, ways of knowing and understanding. We turn, therefore, to 
a sociological tradition that looks for the silences, the invisible, the ghostly, and the haunted. 
 
Turning first to the question of absence, we engage with Omnia el Shakry’s incisive work on 
‘absence in the archive’ which focuses specifically on the Middle East and archives of 
decolonisation (2015). Increasing numbers of Middle East scholars have turned to the archives 
in order to excavate the past. This has produced an extremely rich array of research on Middle 
                                                 
4 For work outlining this, see: Said 1978, Mitchell 1991. 
Eastern social history, particularly during the colonial era, and has shed light on the 
complexities of rapid social and political change. More recently, scholars have critically 
thought through the baggage attached to colonial archives, as well as the silences they contain.5 
Whose voices come through in the archives? What narratives are present? And what is silenced 
in this process? Mirroring many of the discussions we touched on previously in the work of 
Hartman, Smallwood and Lowe, we see careful attention being paid to taking these silences 
seriously, and thinking of ways to centre them. While this work is central to the claims we 
make in this article, we are equally invested in understanding these silences as productive. In 
other words, how can we understand the silences produced by colonialism and anticolonialism 
as exercising agency—or, as Gordon might put it, as haunting us today?  
 
El Shakry visits some of the tensions embedded within the postcolonial archives. Drawing on 
Joanna Sassoon’s “chasing phantoms in the archives,” (2000) she highlights both the difficulty 
of using archives as well as the creative possibilities that arise when scholars find themselves 
free to imagine alternative histories away from state and colonial archives and histories.6  El 
Shakry notes that in the Middle East, the problems with accessing state-controlled archives 
have “led to the resourceful use of oral histories and interviews, family holdings and private 
collections, published memoirs and letters, press reports, and foreign archives,” (2015, 923). 
Ranajit Guha has problematized colonial archives, arguing that sources are not “springs of real 
meaning” or fonts of ‘truth’ but instead grids of intelligibility that enable certain types of 
meaning whilst excluding others.7 Inspired by the idea of tracing history when the archives are 
full of silences, we want to propose the idea of haunting and searching for ghosts as one way 
of dealing with these silences. Not only does haunting put forward one way of telling history 
when the official archives are not present, it also allows us to capture emotive aspects of politics 
that are not always captured in conventional political research and writing.  
 
Similarly, scholars have addressed the problematic of archival silences by looking at 
transatlantic slavery and European empire as sites of silencing. Saidiya Hartman, writing of 
histories of enslavement and emancipation in her Scenes of Subjection, notes how much of the 
archival material we have is replete with silences that conceal the violence of American slavery, 
‘entangled,’ in her words, ‘with the politics of domination’. Reading these archives against the 
grain, Hartman argues, might at once resist and comply with this politics of domination. The 
aim is less to liberate archival material or to fully reconstruct subaltern experiences, but rather 
to explore the tactics of withholding, silencing and censorship as political practice. In doing 
so, we might conduct ‘raids’ on these historical fragments, ‘upon which other narratives can 
be spun’. Similarly, in her own study of transatlantic slavery, Stephanie Smallwood explains 
“I do not seek to create out of the remnants of ledgers... etc... the way it really was... I try to 
interpret from the slave trader's disinterest in the slave's pain [the slaver trader’s silence] those 
social conditions within which there was no possible resolution to that pain. I try to imagine 
what could have been.” (Lowe, 2015: 40) 
                                                 
5 Stoler 2010. 
6 El Shakry 2015. 
7 Guha, 1994. 
 Drawing on Smallwood, Lisa Lowe emphasises the methodological shift elicited by this past 
conditional temporality. Imagining what could have been prompts us to begin from a different 
starting point – “a thinking with a twofold attention that seeks to encompass at once the positive 
objects and methods of history and social science, and also the matters absent, entangled and 
unavailable by its methods” (2015: 40-41)8. Through such thinking we might write with a 
different aim – “To explain the politics of our lack of knowledge.” In this paper, our gaze turns 
to the violence enacted and the concealed ‘over there’. Hartman, Smallwood and Lowe each 
draw our attention to questions of silence, power, agency and knowledge production. We are 
interested in both these methodological approaches to silence as well as how we can understand 
their presence in the present. Shifting context, and taking our cue from Avery Gordon’s 
magisterial Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination, we unpack the ways 
in which the Middle East has been imagined by looking for what is missing, silent, and spectral.  
 
The concept of hauntology owes its roots to Jacques Derrida, who made ghosts the subject of 
analysis in his book Spectres of Marx (2012). Derrida asks us to listen and speak with the 
spectre, to resist the disinclination we have towards this because of how we have been 
academically trained, and to be open to secrets or other forms of knowledge this listening may 
reveal. In Ghostly Matters Avery Gordon asks us why ghosts might matter for sociologists, and 
for a sociology that takes race and empire seriously (2008). For Gordon, to study social life 
means to confront the ghostly aspects of it. This poses a critical challenge to knowledge 
production and the ways in which we legitimise certain forms of knowing over others. “The 
epistemological, ontological, and otherwise philosophical problem of representation—reality 
and illusion, certainty and doubt—becomes infinitely more than a ‘merely’ philosophical 
problem of epistemology, hermeneutics, and deconstruction. It becomes a high-powered 
medium of domination,” (Gordon, 2008: 80). Similarly, Ann Laura Stoler’s work on haunting 
reminds us that empire continues to haunt even after imperialism is formally over. She writes: 
“Haunting occupies the space between what we cannot see and what we know. It wrestles with 
elusive, nontransparent power and, not least, with attunement to the unexpected sites and 
lineaments that such knowledge requires,” (2006). Stoler’s conception of haunting has 
influenced a growing body of work that examines the legacies—both visible and invisible—of 
colonial rule, and how these legacies continue to reproduce inequalities today (2008, 2016). 
 
Moving beyond conventional empiricist and teleological understandings of social change in 
the region, we instead think of empire and its afterlives as having haunting effects that continue 
to condition contexts such as Egypt and Afghanistan. This is not an attempt to abandon all 
empirically grounded research, but rather to ask what we consider ‘empirical’ to mean, for as 
Gordon asks: couldn’t a ghost be understood as empirical data as well? Searching for ghosts 
allows us to move beyond Eurocentric searches for grand narratives and conventional empirical 
evidence in places like Egypt and Afghanistan. It enables us to subvert and resist problematic 
ways of thinking about presence and absence in empiricism more widely, and to centre the 
many silences inflicted upon the Middle East—so long understood as a peripheral Other and a 
                                                 
8 Emphasis ours.  
site of imperial aggression. Haunting helps to displace the hegemonic narrative of the Middle 
East as a space of despotism and ‘backwards’ cultures, focusing instead on imperial and racial 
capitalist processes and their afterlives. Take, for example, the excessive focus on questions of 
veiling or Islamism, which reduce complex social practices to soundbites needing intervention 
and ultimately negation. What does it mean when politics are read through these pre-defined 
categories? What is erased or obfuscated in the process, including the ways in the veil was in 
some places institutionalized through colonialism or how Islamism replaces stories about 
labour organizing as a key mode of alternative politics. We are therefore interested in what is 
present and what that makes absent.  
 
In particular, we address two key tendencies in the literature on the Middle East9 that haunting 
can help to problematise. First, there has been a tendency to understand the Middle East as 
isolated from global processes, thus displacing problems internally and removing responsibility 
from transnational forces, both past and present. What would it mean to instead connect the 
Middle East to histories of empire and the neo-colonial present? The move to understand the 
Middle East through internal realities is linked to a second and connected tendency: to erase 
capitalism and imperialism as global structures that condition Middle Eastern politics. Instead, 
we often hear stories that reify culture or that rely on the ‘Arab despot’ thesis that assumes the 
problems of the Middle East are either cultural or historical, or both.10 However, this article 
proposes that only by centring imperialism and its continual re-inscription can we think of 
alternative stories and historical trajectories.  
 
This article works against many of these tendencies by proposing haunting as a means through 
which to understand and analyse political, social and economic change in the Middle East. 
Haunting allows us to do several things. First, it centres empire and its structural effects in 
understanding the current moment. Second, it understands empire and its aftermath through the 
ghosts, invisibilities and intangible effects it has left behind. Third, it destabilises empiricist 
approaches, such as the transition paradigm, and instead calls for a more radical approach to 
theory-making.  
 
The Federal Crimes Regulation and Afghanistan  
 
 
If, as Avery Gordon contends, “haunting raises specters, and it alters the experience of being 
in time, the way we separate the past, the present, and the future,” (2008: xvi), then these rising 
spectres and time-space parcelisation and alteration can be experienced most palpably in the 
‘nefarious’ border region of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are understood as 
stuck in the past, relics of a crueler time. Here, haunting serves as a critique of the metaphysics 
of the present. Even as Afghanistan’s ‘difficult’ past is held up as the key to understanding its 
‘barbaric’ present, Afghanistan’s history is narrated with a shocking level of abstraction, 
                                                 
9 See: Hanieh 2013, Introduction, for an excellent overview.  
10 As Adam Hanieh notes: “An entire academic industry has developed around attempting to explain the apparent 
persistence and durability of Middle East authoritarianism. Much of this has been heavily Eurocentric, seeking some 
kind of intrinsic “obedience to authority” inherent to the “Arab mind,” (2013, 23). See also: Cavatorta 2010.  
disinterest and resort to Orientalism (cf. Hanifi, 2015). This section zeroes in on one instance 
of this tendency by analysing how these regulations produced the border area between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan as a site of lawlessness by planting and instilling the very lawlessness 
that is now considered its defining characteristic. It shows how contemporary imaginaries of 
Afghanistan are haunted by a colonial practice that disavows its complicity in creating the very 
problem it claims to solve.  
 
 
The Afghan-Pakistan Frontier is regularly depicted as the foremost site of brutality and 
criminality, as “an incubator of chaos and radicalism which threatens the stability of all who 
come into contract with it,” (Hopkins and Marsden 2011: 1). In December 2018, the 
International Observatory of Human Rights declared Afghanistan to be “the worst place in the 
world to be born” based on a UNICEF report (IOHR, 2018). According to the report this is 
owed in no small part to “the terrorist groups” operating in Afghanistan, “decades of intra-state 
conflicts” and “droughts”; what goes unmentioned is imperial intervention, past and present. 
The pervasive image of Afghanistan as a failed state overrun by terrorists finds its most 
passionate expression in representations of the frontier as a space of savagery, chaos, and 
violence. This sempiternal portrayal of Afghanistan has played some role in earning 
Afghanistan the title of ‘the graveyard of empires.’ An inquiry into this unique space (or the 
“lawless badlands” in the words of The Washington Post, 2019) and its concomitant construal 
as a space of ‘exception’ directs us to a legal anomaly – the Frontier Crimes Regulation – and 
its institutionalisation in Afghanistan.  
  
The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was a set of laws formally introduced by the British in 
1901 as a way of dealing with the populations of the ‘border regions’ between India (now 
Pakistan) and Afghanistan. Faced with an ‘unruly tribal population’, subtending the ‘crown 
jewel’ of their vast empire, the colonial authorities devised a series of ad-hoc rules to keep 
these border populations at bay and under control. These ad-hoc rules became institutionalised 
virtually overnight and thus the FCR was born as an expedient way to deal with “the 
territorially bounded tract of land that traverses what today constitutes the Afghan-Pakistan 
border or as a region that is distinct because of its… tribal composition,” (Hopkins and 
Marsden, 2012: 17). The very rendering of Afghanistan as ‘tribal’ is one way to construe the 
country, and the broader frontier region, as retrogressive and therefore as fundamentally 
ungovernable (Manchanda 2018). In this section, we explore the ways in which the British --
through the pliable mechanisms of the FCR -- embedded colonial violence, and quite literally 
legalised it, in a space they deemed unworthy of ‘proper’ governance.  
 
  
 
The FCR, best thought of as a sort of ‘customary law’, was introduced by the British to mitigate 
the conflict between “British laws and the Pathan code of honour.”11 They were enacted in the 
                                                 
11 Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, W.R.H Merk, IOR, Correspondence Image 11.JPG No. 58, dated 
Peshawar, 25th January 1898 
area around the now notorious Durand Line – a 1200 mile ‘scientific frontier’ delineated by 
the British in 1893 – originally home to three million pastoralists (Cullather 2002: 516). The 
official Durand boundary treaties were signed in Persian for Abdur Rahman, then the Emir of 
Afghanistan and in English for the British and applied on the ground in six distinct stages by 
British and Afghan officials in collaboration (Hanifi, 2011: 3). The asymmetrical power 
relations between the British and the Afghans were never in question; the Durand Line 
deliberately followed a topographic ridgeline that could be held at strong-points blocking 
mountain passes that the British ascertained as crucial to the defence of their empire (Cullather 
2002: 517).12 The Durand Line noticeably altered market relations to the detriment of the 
Afghans by politically isolating and diverting capital away from Afghanistan and towards 
British India (Hanifi, 2011: 4-6).  But for our purposes, it is the legacy and the hauntology – in 
this case, the remnants of a future foretold – of the haphazardly ordained and installed FCR in 
lieu of standardised civil and criminal codes, that is most pertinent here. 
 
The FCR were formally repealed in 201813. The reason for this repeal is stated in no uncertain 
terms by the leaders of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)14 as the necessary 
dismantling of a “draconian” set of laws that “violate the fundamental rights of the citizens of 
this area,” (Hussein, 2017). Under the archaic FCR, an innocent individual can be imprisoned 
for the crimes of their kin, the government can displace entire villages without compensation, 
explanation, or warning, and individuals can languish behind bars for up to three years without 
any charges being filed (Akins, 2017). The law states that three basic rights will be denied to 
those under its jurisdiction – appeal, wakeel and daleel (the right to request a change to a 
conviction in any court, the right to legal representation and the right to present reasoned 
evidence, respectively). As mentioned above, the FCR was galvanised by the Raj’s decision to 
exclude the frontier and its denizens from the empire proper whilst simultaneously staking out 
its claim on the territory and citizens. The people of this region – that includes the areas of 
Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, Waziristan – were transformed into imperial 
vassals through this regulation, which denied them access to colonial courts and other 
governance institutions. Under the disingenuous guise of ‘respecting independence,’ railway 
construction and irrigation projects were excluded from the areas that came under the FCR. 
Simultaneously, the recruitment of ‘tribal militias’, who served on outposts and the border 
between British India and Afghanistan, converted Pashtun farmers and herders into wage 
labourers, further deepening their dependence on the colonial economic system at almost no 
cost to the colonial state. Most damagingly, the FCR enshrined the ability to arrest without 
warrant in certain cases.15 
 
In its utilisation of indigenous labour for the advancement of empire, FCR is an ingenious 
colonial artifice, In 1921 one of its proponents described as: “Not the least wonderful of the 
many marvellous methods employed in keeping our fickle and excitable neighbours [North of 
                                                 
12 See: George McMunn, Afghanistan from Darius to Amanhullah (London: G. Bells and Sons Ltd., 1929). 
13 The full legal text of the FCR is available at the British Library at: IOR/L/PJ/6/579, dated 1901, India Office 
Records, Asian & African Collections, British Library. 
14 A semi-autonomous tribal region in Afghanistan/Pakistan. 
15 Ibid. 
the Durand Line] in order is the use made of the Pathans themselves to protect our marches.” 
The FCR recognised the existence of the Council of Elders, commonly known as the jirga but 
made the British Deputy Commissioner in charge of nominating and overseeing these Elders, 
with the constitutional right to override any decision he did not agree with. The Deputy-
Commissioner was the ultimate arbiter – he could question, overturn and veto any of the jirga’s 
decisions.  Another major hindrance in making the jirga an effective part of the FCR was its 
variation in use of tribal code (Pashtunwali), riwaj (broadly understood as customary law), or 
Sharia (Islamic law), depending on the tribes and their geographic location.   
 
The “excitable and revengeful temperament of the Pathan and Pathanized population” was used 
as the justification for many amendments in the FCR that directly prosecute groups of people, 
‘families’ and ‘tribes’ rather than the individual committing the crime. The archives – mostly 
located in the India Office Records at the British Library – reveal a deep-seated colonial 
anxiety: the frontier represented a space that needed to be ‘managed’ but always from a 
distance. Afghanistan was mostly a buffer, a place in between two meaningful entities (India 
and Russia) and so, rather than committing to a system of legal justice, the British installed a 
quick-fix set of punitive measures that held entire populations at ransom. At the crux of the 
many changes to the FCR was a desire to make groups of people, rather than just individuals 
culpable for petty and not-so-petty crime. These ‘tribal’ groups were mostly considered a 
nuisance to empire, excess populations subject to (often lackadaisical and abortive) attempts 
to ‘contain’, ‘silence’, and consigned to a space of indifference. 
 
Hence, in the spirit of this conjuring up of mass criminality and with imperial expedience at 
the forefront, we see significant changes made to the already harsh and swingeing legal 
apparatus of the FCR in the early 20th century. We expand with a few poignant instances of 
how the colonial legal apparatus produced spectral figures for its own legitimation. First, 
section 35 of the FCR is amended from “when any person is known or believed to have a blood 
feud, or has occasioned cause of quarrel likely to lead to bloodshed, the Deputy ‘Commissioner 
may require that person to reside beyond the territory to which this Regulation or any part of it 
extends, or at such place within that territory as the Deputy Commissioner may deem desirable” 
to “when any family is known to have a blood feud, or has occasioned cause of quarrel likely 
to lead to bloodshed, the Deputy Commissioner may require that family or any member of it 
to reside, &c.”16 Likewise, the section on ‘preventive crimes’ is revisited to raise the maximum 
sentence of imprisonment, and sanctions the raising of “entire buildings” used by robbers as 
well as the “blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribes,” based on suspicion of wrongdoing by an 
individual. Tellingly, sections of the FCR applied only to the ‘Pathans’ and the ‘Baluch.’ 
“Urban residents and the Hindus” as well as British subjects and their servants, Europeans, and 
Americans were also all exempt from the FCR.  
 
It is in the interstices of the text of the FCR and the exceptions and erasures that are implicit in 
this text, that colonial ghosts dwell. By granting ‘protection’ from the law to the lawful non-
                                                 
16 IOR/L/PJ/6/579, dated 1901, India Office Records, Asian & African Collections, British Library. 
 
Afghans, the Afghans are always already felonious criminals. The (in)justice system glimpsed 
at here, continues to reverberate in the organisation of the Afghan/Pakistan border regions in 
the 21st century. Not only do ghosts of the FCR continue to haunt us today in the form of 
exceptionally repressive and disproportionate penalties, the FCR’s institutionalisation of 
injustice will reverberate in the years to come. Two scholars analysing the workings of the FCR 
on the Pakistani side bemoan the injustice of the system thus: “the jurisdiction of the higher 
courts i.e., High Court and Supreme Court, have not been extended and judicial powers still 
are centered in the office of Presiding Officer, defying justice and fair trial. This legal vacuum 
has drastically jeopardized peace and the socio-political development of the tribal belt” (Khan 
and Khan, 2012: 1). 
 
Ironically, the FCR is often presented as evidence of British flexibility in the face of “lawless 
tribal customs” – and this also legitimises the exclusion of other ‘non-tribal’ residents from it. 
And yet, communication between those enacting these legislations suggests cleavages between 
the British and the indigenous people that can too easily be disregarded as “cultural 
differences.” In a letter to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, W.R.H Merk, Esquire, 
C.S.I commissioner and superintendent, Peshawar division confesses his bewilderment:  
 
The conflict between our laws and the Pathan code of honour must continue 
till such time as the Pathan changes his nature (and that will not be soon) for 
we cannot possibly mould our system to fit barbarous and blood-thirsty 
customs. It is curious that where we do endeavour, to some degree, to meet 
Pathan ideas on the subject of the misconduct of women, in making adultery 
by women severely punishable, aggrieved husbands very rarely avail 
themselves of this provision of the regulation.17 
 
One can be forgiven for reading the FCR as a system of punitive rules that not only subjected 
those under its remit to the mercy of one man: the (British, or British agent) Deputy High-
Commissioner, but also as a colonial project that was directly implicated in systematising 
exceptionally harsh punishments for women, for what most people would agree are relatively 
minor crimes like adultery, and these punitive measures were not seen to be massively popular 
with the local populace. That the FCR was unwelcome by those subject to it was attested to 
when hundreds of Pashtuns protested against the FCR and other discriminatory regulations 
introduced by the colonial government in Peshawar on April 23, 1930. In what became a major 
incident, the British army’s response was the murder of hundreds of these unarmed Pashtun 
protesters at the Qissa Khwani Bazaar (ibid). 
 
The FCR changed the face of what was to become the North-West frontier. State power on the 
southern side of the NWF was bureaucratised and standardised, whereas the Pashtuns in 
Afghanistan experienced a highly personalised and autocratic form of state power because of 
the British and the FCR, but also because of the personality of Abdur Rahman himself. 
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Moreover, a far greater number of Pashtuns in British India had access to a broad set of 
commercial resources and could participate in networks of economic trade and military-labour 
migrations in mainland South Asia as well as in the Middle East. The legacy of the FCR, as an 
ad-hoc system of penalties and incarceration, has been the institutionalisation of unwarranted 
punishment, arbitrary curfews, and a continued maltreatment of the people living in these 
‘frontier regions’. Without wishing to romanticise or standardise the experience of the Indian 
colonial subject(s), those on the “right” side of the Durand Line certainly found themselves in 
a more privileged position, especially with regard to the ability to tap into the global 
circulations of colonial capital vis-à-vis their Afghan counterparts as well as to be relatively 
shielded from the worst excesses of the colonial legal infrastructure.  
 
The systematic policing and the invasive powers of the FCR continues to haunt, and can tell us 
a lot about the carceral state today. Whilst critical carceral studies is largely focused on the US 
and its neoliberal architecture of policing (LeBron, 2019; Vitale, 2017), Afghanistan was a 
laboratory par excellence for the British empire’s finessing of the powers of surveillance, 
preventive crime and punitive governance. This is all the more remarkable given that 
Afghanistan always unyoked from ‘empire proper’, it was designed to be only colonised in the 
most disengaged and disarticulated of manners. If “haunting is one way in which abusive 
systems of power make themselves known and their impacts felt in everyday life” (Gordon, 
2012: 8) it is no surprise that Afghanistan continues to be referred as ‘the graveyard of empires’. 
This Orientalist trope interpellates Afghanistan as a land shrouded in mystery, drawing 
attention to its ghostly and deathly character. Whilst we recognise the danger of what appears 
to be reproducing, or even giving more currency to this image of Afghanistan as a spectral site, 
it is in this now ‘common-sense’ rendering of Afghanistan as a graveyard that we see an 
acknowledgement of colonial ghosts: ghosts that continue to structure all imperial knowledges 
and narratives about Afghanistan, but also crucially ghosts that forever deter the exhumation 
of colonial violence.  
 
Paradoxically, by claiming exclusive knowledge of Afghanistan through this graveyard canard 
and by rendering Afghanistan legible to its imperial audience in this simplistic way, we are 
denied the possibility of mistakes and unlearning that haunting requires of us. For us, as for 
Gordon, haunting is a “very particular way of knowing what has happened or is happening”, it 
“draws us affectively, sometimes against our will and always a bit magically, into the structure 
of feeling of a reality that we come to experience, not as cold knowledge, but as a 
transformative recognition” (2012: 8). Haunting unsettles the relationship between the past and 
the present, between knowledge and feeling, and recentres social justice when confronted with 
systems of knowledge production and cultivation that exalt colonial scientific paradigms above 
all others. Afghanistan is presented as a graveyard, a space of haunting from ‘time 
immemorial’, but the ghosts produced by colonial discourses and knowledges in the form of 
laws, and those both subject to and exempt from those laws, are swept under the rug. The 
analytics of haunting complicates the straightforward historiographies of Afghanistan as terra 
nulius before the British ‘discovered’ it, and at the same time, populated with incorrigible 
‘tribes’ who continue to resist modernisation and benevolent imperialism. Haunting is more 
than just a reminder to look at the past to understand the present, rather it troubles the very 
notion that the past and the present are necessarily and always distinct categories. The fact it 
was the British who sought to increase penalties for women for ‘wrongdoing’ and not Afghans, 
can be read the contemporary tendency to view misogynistic practices as an inherent product 
of Afghan culture and religion which obscures the emergence of these practices – as at least in 
part stemming from colonially imposed systems and values, that continue to haunt. To see how 
this haunting plays out in a different context, we now turn our gaze towards contemporary 
Egypt.  
 
Contemporary Egypt and the spectre of anticolonial nationalism 
 
If Afghanistan and the FCR has much to tell us about the ghosts of colonial violence, the focus 
of this section—Egypt and anticolonial nationalism—looks instead at the ghosts of 
postcolonial violence. Where the previous section focused on the FCR as a pivotal moment in 
nation-making in colonial and postcolonial Afghanistan, this section similarly takes a 
monumental moment that traces the movement between colonial and postcolonial Egypt 
through the lens of nationalism: the nationalisation of the Suez Canal.18 We show how this 
moment can be unpacked as a site of haunting, and why this matters in understanding 
postcolonial Egypt and its discontents.   
 
In this section, we show that colonial and postcolonial haunting are two sides of the same coin; 
in other words, the postcolonial moment similarly creates afterlives and legacies that haunt the 
present in complex ways (Salem 2019). While we see similar tales of colonial violence in 
Egypt, we instead interrogate what came after decolonisation, and how the shift from the 
colonial to the postcolonial—however tenuous it may have been—produced its own ghosts. 
We further ask what it means to think of these ghosts as haunting in ways that both provoke 
social violence as well as prevent it. Where much work on haunting has looked at the ways in 
which haunting is a destructive or limiting force that produces violence, in this section we show 
that haunting equally has the ability to limit violence. In particular, we are interested in two 
‘Suez Canal moments’ that highlight the ways in which haunting both produces violence while 
also setting limits to regressive political projects. To do this, we focus on nationalism and 
nation-making during the anticolonial period (1952-1967) and the post-revolutionary period 
(2011 onwards), attempting to draw out the ‘spectre’ of anticolonial nationalism that continues 
to haunt Egypt. 
 
It has been a common refrain to understand contemporary Egyptian politics through the 
narrative of revolution (2011) and counter-revolution (2013 onwards). Nationalism played a 
starring role in both moments, although it was mobilised very differently by different groups 
of people.19 Throughout the revolutionary events of 2011, Egyptians mobilised nationalism to 
critique, contest and disrupt the decay that had overtaken the country, materially, politically 
and socially. There was a questioning of what had happened to Egypt, the nation, and whether 
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it belonged to Egyptians or to the state and its corrupt elite. In particular, the idea of who Egypt 
belongs to raises interesting questions about the nation and how it is organised, and how this 
can be understood politically by asking who benefits from national wealth, understood broadly 
(Massad 2012). At the same time, however, nationalism was being mobilised by the state and 
Egyptian elites to limit, restrict and demobilise revolutionary currents. This iteration, often 
referred to as hyper or ultra-nationalism, mobilises ideas of the nation and who belongs in it to 
instead push forward a counter-revolution. At various moments since 2013, when the counter-
revolution was solidified in the form of a new military-led government, nationalism has been 
invoked to defend rising coercion and violence against Egyptians, both those who engage in 
political contestation and those who are mere bystanders.  
 
These mobilisations of the nation reveal the complex ways in which belonging and 
responsibility form part of any revolutionary moment. They are also connected to historical 
formations of the nation and nationalism in Egypt, in ways that complicate the prospect of 
understanding 2011 and its aftermath as a purely contemporary event (Khalidi 1991). In what 
follows, we trace the ‘spectre’ of anticolonial nationalism and its afterlives. We use this spectre 
not to ask whether or not it still haunts contemporary Egyptian politics, but rather to explore 
how we can understand the invocations of nationalism today by paying attention to its mere 
presence in the past. How did the promises and changes put forward by anticolonial nationalism 
in Egypt set the contours of what politics means for decades to come? How did this particular 
historical moment, and its understanding of nationalism, produce effects that influence how 
‘nationalism’ can—or cannot—be invoked by the Egyptian state and elite today? Using the 
particular infrastructure of the Suez Canal, we explore two moments during which Egyptian 
nationalism was recast around the Canal and what it represented within Egypt. The first 
moment is the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1956; the second 
moment is the building of a ‘new Suez Canal’ by Abdelfattah al Sisi in 2014. We show that the 
spectre of the first Suez Canal moment could not help but haunt the second moment, producing 
an instance of failure20 in Egypt’s counter-revolutionary trajectory post-2013. By reading these 
two moments alongside one another, we can glimpse the spectre of anticolonial nationalism 
and how it continues to haunt Egypt today. 
 
Soon after coming to power via a military coup in 2013, Abdelfattah al-Sisi announced the 
building of a new Suez Canal. It was difficult to miss the connection he was trying to invoke 
between himself and Gamal Abdel Nasser, who in 1956 famously nationalised the Suez Canal 
in a moment of postcolonial resistance. As El Bernoussi notes, Nasser’s nationalisation can be 
read as his “attempt to materialize the Egyptian people’s dignity in their right to control the 
canal,” invoking claims to postcolonial sovereignty (2015: 369). Although initially appearing 
to gain Sisi widespread support, the new Canal quickly became the target of criticism, jokes, 
and overall condemnation. The dominant rhetoric that was used around the new Canal very 
much echoed older ideas around nationalism, the state, and major infrastructural projects that 
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were ‘for the good of the nation.’ Egypt needed to expand the Canal because it was both good 
for national morale and Egypt’s global standing, and because it would bring in much needed 
economic income. The Suez Canal was expanded, with millions of Egyptian pounds poured 
into it—largely by private companies despite the rhetoric around it being a state-led project—
and amidst the displacement of communities around the Canal and massive fears about 
environmental destruction. These last two effects, did, at least, echo the effects of the first Suez 
Canal moment. 
 
Sisi had clearly hoped that the expansion would help him build a project of national legitimacy, 
as by that point—2014—his popularity was somewhat on the decline after the high levels of 
support the military enjoyed in 2013. And yet the project did not do the political work he had 
expected it to, an expectation not wholly unwarranted given that Nasser had been extremely 
successful in gaining political support through his political mobilisation of the Canal, which, 
as noted, mobilised a material politics of national dignity (El Bernoussi 2015). Where Nasser 
was able to mobilise the Suez Canal—and a second infrastructural project, the High Dam in 
Aswan—to produce a powerful hegemonic project that ensured his control over Egypt’s ruling 
elite (ibid), Sisi largely failed to employ the Canal in a similar way. There are numerous ways 
this difference can be explained, not least the radically different historical context that produced 
Nasserism. We argue that the spectre of the first Suez moment—and its successful invocation 
of anticolonial nationalism—was partly what led to the failure of the second Suez moment. In 
other words, to understand the failure of this second moment, we need to return to the first. 
 
In an article on Sisi’s ‘new Suez Canal,’ Amira Salah-Ahmed notes: “The project was lauded 
as a national achievement, on par with the construction of Aswan’s High Dam,” (2014). This 
sentiment was repeated in both the media and official statements, constantly drawing people’s 
attention to a supposed connection between these two moments. The nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal under Nasser was not only a central tenet of the anticolonial nationalist project that had 
emerged, but was also an event of global significance (Tignor 2015). Debates around the 
financing of the High Dam in Aswan—Nasser’s major infrastructural project—set the scene 
for the nationalization of the canal. The High Dam was seen as part of Egypt’s industrialisation 
project, as controlling floods would provide water for irrigation and generate electricity as well 
as benefit Egypt’s farmland. The Egyptians preferred European private capital to American or 
World Bank financing. However English Electric—the main firm involved—threatened to 
back out of the deal if the World Bank was not included (Louis and Owen 1989: 105). An arms 
deal with the Czechs that year, as well as Egypt’s increasingly warm overtures to the Soviets, 
added more tension to already-fraught negotiations. The eventual decision by the British and 
US governments not to finance the dam was a culmination of growing tensions over the 
politicised nature of conditionalities attached to loans from the World Bank as well as Nasser’s 
emerging non-aligned position.21  
 
Nevertheless, the decision to withdraw foreign funding still came as a shock to Nasser (Heikal, 
1986: 74). Nasser’s response was swift, and shocked the world: on July 26 1956, in a speech 
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he gave to the Egyptian public, he announced the full nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
Company.22 The local response was ecstatic: 
 
There was a moment of silent incredulity, as the significance of what they had just 
heard sank into the quarter of a million people crowded into Menshiyeh Square 
(Alexandria). Then pandemonium erupted and scenes of wild excitement broke out 
in towns and villages through the length and breadth of the land where millions had 
been clustered round their radios to listen to the President’s speech. Nobody in 
Egypt slept much that night (Heikal, 1986: 127). 
 
The response from the SCC was to push for total warfare, while calling for an international 
organisation that would take over the assets of the SCC and manage the canal (Heikal, 1986: 
122). Following a build-up of tension that predated Nasser’s announcement, Britain, France 
and Israel attacked Egypt in what became known as the tripartite aggression. This soon came 
to an abrupt halt following a global outcry as well as the refusal of the US to support the 
invasion. Although the aim of the attack had been to discredit and remove Nasser, he not only 
emerged as the major figure of Arab and postcolonial politics, but it largely discredited the 
French and the British. Writing on the Suez crisis, Nasser later recalled: 
 
The battle of Suez, which was one of the major landmarks in the Egyptian 
revolutionary experiment, was not merely a moment in which the Egyptian people 
discovered themselves or the Arab nation discovered its potentialities but was a 
moment of international significance and helped all oppressed people discover 
infinite latent powers in themselves (Nasser, 1954: 12). 
 
These major infrastructural projects, we argue, should be seen as central to the politics of 
decolonisation. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal, referred to as the “lifeline of the British 
Empire,” (Tignor 2015: 171) remains a pivotal moment of decolonisation, symbolising both 
the end of Britain’s global influence as well as the emergence of Nasser as the leader of Arab 
nationalism. As Ali Hillal Dessouki notes, Suez reflected a conflict between a dying world 
order and a new order waiting to be born (Louis and Owen 1989: 31). Nationalising the Canal 
was symbolic of the new direction Egypt was to move in. Debates around nationalising the 
Canal make visible both the racialised assumptions held by colonial officers (Egyptians cannot 
run the Canal, thus it must be under international control) as well as the nationalist ones held 
by Nasser and the Officers (full sovereignty includes full ownership over Egyptian land and 
control over all sources of revenue). The nationalisation of the Canal was very much the 
moment during which Nasser cemented his hegemony, underlining the importance of 
anticolonial nationalism. Moving beyond concerns about the revenue of the Canal (although 
this may have been the initial rationale), the nationalisation came to symbolise an attempt by a 
postcolonial nation to assert its full sovereignty, economically and politically—with all of the 
traps this entailed. 
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The ‘new Suez Canal’ deployed very similar rhetoric vis-à-vis nationalism and nation-building. 
In particular, Sisi made it clear that the project was one that belonged to the Egyptian people, 
largely because they directly paid for it. In an interview three years after the ‘new Suez Canal’ 
was completed, it was stated that ‘the Egyptian people’ paid for the project, given that over 
LE64 billion was donated by Egyptians (Mohamed 2018). Earlier, when the project was 
announced, it was said that both the Tahya Masr fund and ‘public contributions’ would finance 
the project (Salah-Ahmed 2014). A complex range of financing certificates were available, 
specifically targeted at different income groups to allow “every segment of society to 
contribute to the project,” (ibid). This connection between the Egyptian people, Egyptian 
resources, and independence brings back the spectre of a distant past, during which these very 
ideas were mobilised to seemingly similar nationalist ends. The new Canal, just like the old 
one, was as Egyptian as could be, a result of national pride and an Egyptian drive for 
development.  
 
And yet this focus on public financing served to hide the return of other ghosts, ghosts from a 
not-so-distant past. The inauguration of the ‘new Suez Canal’ was a lavish and global affair; 
but particularly haunting was the sudden reappearance of Mubarak-era businessmen and 
companies, the very targets of 2011 revolutionary anger. Ahmed ‘Ezz, steel tycoon, was first 
on the list of sponsors, despite that fact that he was commonly understood as one of the most 
corrupt businessmen of the Mubarak era. Ezz had only recently been released from prison after 
spending three years behind bars on corruption charges, and was awaiting retrial in another 
graft case. Also on the list of sponsors was Talaat Moustafa Group, who had also faced charges 
for corruption under Mubarak. Ceramica Cleopatra—owned by Mohamed Aboul Enein, a 
Mubarak business associate and member of the National Democratic Party—was also on the 
list. Along with the old, new sponsors such as Ahmed Abou Hashima signal that while the past 
is back to haunt the present, the present is not the past. Abou Hashima is very much a 
newcomer, fully supporting and supported by the new military government.  
 
The juxtaposition of these two aspects of the ‘new Suez Canal’ highlight the power of the 
spectre of anticolonial nationalism: where the first instance succeeded in connecting nation-
building, the Egyptian people, and economic development, the second instance failed and was 
instead mired in controversy and failure. The first moment was produced through and in turn 
produced the anticolonial nationalism of Nasserism; the second moment—although attempting 
to replicate this form of anticolonial nationalism—instead ended up collapsing in on itself. This 
second moment was read as an instance of hyper/ultra-nationalism, and an attempt by Egypt’s 
elite to profit from, rather than develop, the country. This further sheds light on the different 
historical junctures during which these two moments occur. Nasser’s anticolonial nationalism 
was complicated by its presumed necessity at that point in time, despite the damage it was to 
cause in both the short and long term, not least the form of anti-democratic politics it centred. 
Sisi’s mobilisation of anticolonial nationalism, however, was not seen as necessary, largely 
because of the way it was mobilised and the historical juncture during which it emerged. 
Instead, its failures were centred. 
 
The centrality of Suez to Egypt’s most powerful political project – Nasserism – goes some way 
in highlighting why its spectre remains. The spectre of both Suez and the anticolonial 
nationalist project it was produced by and in turn produced, then, continues to haunt 
contemporary Egypt in ways that destabilise the current ruling elite. Can we understand the 
‘new Suez Canal’—both in its material creation as well as in its failure to create political capital 
for Sisi and the Egypt’s broader elite—without reading it against the ‘old’ Suez Canal? By 
reading these two moments alongside one another—or against one another—we have shown 
that haunting can help in understanding their connectedness in ways that other methodological 
approaches might not. Haunting allows us to capture the energy, hope and aspirations of the 
first moment, and how these have been mobilised since, without ever quite succeeding.  
 
This reading of the Suez Canal in turn suggests that while empire produced its afterlives, 
resistance to empire equally produced debris, afterlives, and spectres (Grovogui 2011). It is the 
spectre of anticolonial nationalism, after all, that we focus on here. These postcolonial 
afterlives, however, do a different type of political work: they destabilise contemporary 
attempts at political violence. By its mere presence it delegitimises attempts at hegemony by 
Egypt’s ruling elite today; it shows that this happened before—but differently (Salem 2019). 
This does not signify a moment during which there was less political violence; the building of 
the Aswan Dam, for instance, was heavily paid for by workers, displaced communities, and 
nature. It is rather to say that what was different was the presence of a political project that 
resonated across many sections of Egypt; an articulation of nationalism that spoke to many 
(Grovogui 2011). Where Nasser was able to represent the nationalisation of the Suez Canal as 
being for the good of the nation, the “new Suez Canal” was instead understood as for the good 
of the military and capital. In an attempt to grasp political legitimacy through an appeal to the 
first moment of nationalisation, Sisi instead made clear just how different these two moments 
were. The spectre of success was neatly brought to the present to reside alongside the chaos, 
violence and counter-revolution of post-revolutionary Egypt. So, whereas, haunting discloses 
a continuity in the case of Afghanistan, in Egypt haunting discloses a rupture and a difference, 
and in both cases changes our understanding of these two moments in history, by emphasising 
the many avatars of colonial violence. 
 
Conclusion: searching for ghosts  
 
This article has explored the possibility of recognising ghosts, haunting and spectres as ways 
of producing theory and searching for what is invisible or intangible, yet constitutive, in 
Afghanistan and Egypt. This not only destabilises common-sense empiricist approaches to 
sociology that have long dominated analyses of the Middle East, it also centres empire and its 
afterlives in the understanding of Middle East politics. Here we probe alternative archives and 
interpret ‘empirics’ differently. Rather than view these two contexts as cases through which to 
‘test’ or ‘apply’ social theory, we have asked how revisiting particular moments in these 
contexts is generative of social theory itself. Looking for ghosts and spectres also raises 
questions around what we understand to be theory, evidence, or ‘data.’ Searching for ghosts is 
a productive way of ‘doing theory’ that moves us beyond Eurocentric searches for grand 
narratives and empirical evidence in places like Egypt and Afghanistan. By interrogating what 
is said and unsaid in contemporary discourses on Afghanistan and Egypt, we have asked what 
it means to centre a region like the Middle East, which has for so long concomitantly served as 
a peripheral Other and a key site of imperial aggression. Looking at the generative force of 
haunting also displaces the hegemonic narrative about the Middle East as a land of despotic 
rulers disconnected from imperial and racial capitalist processes and modes of production. 
Crucially, haunting also allows for a way of capturing the unspoken and the emotive; difficult 
modes of knowing that are difficult to capture and yet which so often drive politics. We argue 
that in this article, haunting allows us to capture the social violence of colonial rule in 
Afghanistan on the one hand, and the hope and optimism of anticolonial nationalism in Egypt 
on the other. The juxtaposing of these cases, then, allows us to show why colonial and 
postcolonial haunting are two sides of the same coin. 
 
Following this special issue’s call to explore global structural formations and their links to an 
intensification of authoritarianism, this article has proposed two answers. In relation to 
Afghanistan, we have shown that European empire as a global structural formation is directly 
linked to contemporary political crisis in both Afghanistan and the wider the Middle East. 
Punitive governance in the form of the FCR in Afghanistan was deemed justified, even 
necessary, to deal with the wild and lawless peoples of the frontier. Yet, the minutiae of the 
legalese show that this lawlessness was installed and reproduced through the official 
mechanisms of the FCR itself. The “barbarous and bloodthirsty customs” of the Pathans 
lamented by the British are not merely racialised tropes, they are the material and recursive 
effects of empire that continue to haunt Afghanistan today.   
 
In relation to Egypt, we focused on the afterlives of the postcolonial project that emerged under 
Nasser, a very specific afterlife of European empire. This postcolonial project continues to 
haunt the Egyptian present, in expected and unexpected ways. In particular, it sets some of the 
contours around which Egypt’s current ruling elite must work within. The ‘second Suez Canal 
moment’ highlights that Sisi was not simply addressing the present political context, but also 
had to contend with the past, in the form of the original Suez Canal moment. Because of the 
significant differences between these two moments, it seems almost inevitable that the second 
was bound to fail. This failure, and the intense social and political violence surrounding Egypt’s 
post-revolutionary context in general, cannot be read separately from the spectre of anticolonial 
nationalism. Given Sisi’s purposeful attempts at drawing parallels between his project and that 
of Nasser’s, it seems pertinent that we think through how elements of Egypt’s postcolonial past 
seep into the present.  
 
This article thus builds on work that decentres Eurocentric forms of knowledge production by 
calling for more intuitive methods of research that take seriously the possibility of invisible 
and intangible presences. This is especially relevant to the Middle East, which has long been 
disciplined into Eurocentric and empiricist theoretical frameworks. By paying attention to 
ghosts and the processes of haunting they engender in their wake, we have partaken in what 
Julietta Singh calls a “vulnerable reading” (Singh, 2016: 98-108), a counter-hegemonic 
strategy that resists masterful narratives and disciplinary enclosures. By listening to ghosts, 
being sensitive to their lingering effects, we have advocated for a more open-ended reading of 
two moments in Afghanistan and Egypt, but we hope that this creates the space for thinking 
otherwise our postcolonial present, more generally. Haunting is a (methodological) tool that 
helps us acknowledge our own complicity in asymmetrical power relations as well as offering 
a way of envisioning a radically different future. It offers us a way of peaceably co-existing 
with ghosts rather than forcefully, and ultimately unsuccessfully, banishing them. 
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